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The article focuses on the analysis of the constitutional model of the Russian economy, 
including its conceptual underpinnings, fundamental principles, and overall design. 
Particular attention is paid to the problem of so-called “conflicting values” that are equally 
recognized by the constitutional foundation of the Russian economy. For example, the 
values of economic freedom and the usefulness of state regulation, and the importance 
of supporting competition and guaranteeing of social justice, are discussed as examples 
of conflicting principles. The authors conclude there is no irresolvable conflict. These 
equal constitutional values (i.e. the principles of economic freedom and the social nature 
of the state) create a “corridor of opportunities” which the state’s socioeconomic policy 
is balancing within in order to contribute to stability and sustainable development. It is 
noted in the article that the welfare state constitutional model becomes ineffective in 
modern conditions. In practice, excessive state social commitments lead to the exhaustion 
of the sources of growth, and to the slowdown and deterioration of human capital. The 
implementation of the concept of the workfare state is considered as the most promising. 
Furthermore, the authors show that the idea of the “neutrality” of the Constitutional 
Court in an assessment of economic regulations facilitates unlimited state expansion into 
the economy, provokes economic inequality and the decline of guarantees of economic 
liberties, and, as a result, leads to an economic slowdown.
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Introduction:  
Conceptual Underpinnings of the Constitutional Model  
of the Russian Economy
the impact of constitutional provisions on economic reality is perhaps one of the 
most complicated and promising research subjects for both theory and practice.
economists, legal scholars, and political scientists consider these issues from 
different perspectives. economists went beyond the boundaries of “ordinary” 
economic analysis of constitutions and created a new discipline, i.e. constitutional 
economics (the term was born in the early 1980s in the united states). this research 
program examines how constitutional rules (principles, institutions) affect the 
freedom of choice and the activities of economic and political agents. in addition 
to analyzing constitutional provisions as external constraints, they are trying to 
determine the origin of these rules.
As is widely known, one of the founders of constitutional economics was the 
American economist, Nobel laureate (1986) James M. Buchanan (1919–2013).1 
together with his colleague Gordon tullock (1922–2014) and other members of 
the virginia school of economics,2 he made an exceptional contribution to the 
1  See, for example, the historical essay on this topic in the discussion papers: viktor J. vanberg, 
Constitutional Political Economy, Freiburger diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik 15/06 (2015) 
(May 3, 2018), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118597.
2  See Francesco Parisi et al., Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics, 28(1) Constitu-
tional Political economy 48 (2017).
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development of public choice theory,3 which has extended economic methods 
to issues traditionally related to the political sphere. By developing these ideas, 
constitutional economists direct their interest
to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals 
interact, and the processes through which these rules and institutions are 
chosen or come into being.4
in modern russia, the ideas of constitutional economics entered into scholarly 
discourse around the mid-1990s. this period saw a surge of positivism in russian 
socio-economic sciences, so the constitutional economics theory transferred to 
russian soil without its philosophical and methodological background. the western 
intellectual heritage was not close to the worldview of a large part of russian 
scholars formed in the soviet socio-cultural and political reality. Leaving aside the 
issues of economic philosophy, russian legal scholars and economists focused on 
applied problems related to the analysis of the impact of constitutional principles 
on an economy in transition. Among other things, experts who backed the russian 
reformers highly appreciated the idea that the establishment of the economic rules 
and limits in the constitution (the Fundamental Law) could contribute to the rule of 
law in russia, the transition to a market economy, and economic development.
As pointed out by Pyotr Barenboim and Natalya Merkulova in their essay, dedi-
cated to the 25th anniversary of constitutional economics,
we believe that one of the ways for the rule of Law and economic 
development to expand beyond the business and corporate law perspective 
is through adopting fundamental principles resulting from constitutional and 
institutional analysis. the constitutional approach is not purely theoretical 
and is meant to be utilized to serve more practical tasks discussed within 
the rule of Law concept.5
As a result, russia has gradually developed a new discipline based on the 
approaches and methods of institutional economics and constitutional law, i.e. 
konstitutsionnaya economica.
this russian term sounds similar to the english “constitutional economics.” 
therefore, in order to underline the difference between the western and russian 
3  the public choice theory emerged in the 1940s and was developed in the 1960s.
4  James M. Buchanan, The Domain of Constitutional Economics, 1(1) Constitutional Political economy 
1 (1990).
5  Pyotr Barenboim & Natalya Merkulova, 25th Anniversary of Constitutional Economics: The Russian Model 
and Legal Reform in Russia in The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform 161 (F. Neate & 
h. Nielsen (eds.), Moscow: yustitsinform, 2007).
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approaches, russian literature often uses the terms Constitutional economic theory 
or Constitutional Political economy to specify the intellectual heritage of Buchanan 
and his followers, and the term Constitutional economics to specify the russian 
research tradition.6 the russian model of the constitutional economics analyzes the 
constitutional and legal prerequisites for the effective development of an economy; 
studies the impact of economic crises on the state’s constitutional institutions, as well 
as the impact of constitutional crises on the economy; explores the consequences 
of the globalization of the international economy for the constitutional processes 
in individual countries, etc. Furthermore, as noted in the work by Barenboim and 
Merkulova already cited, constitutional economics became a basis for legal reform in 
russia as well as in post-soviet and other transitional countries. this discipline provides 
a practical methodology for evaluating legislation, especially budget legislation.
the most comprehensive works in the field of constitutional economics belong to 
the renowned russian scholars Pyotr Barenboim, Gadis Gadzhiev, vladimir Lafitskiy, 
vladimir Mau, veniamin yakovlev, and others.7
Few people remember this today, but the question of the “level” of a legal act 
which aims to establish the new model of the russian economy, was discussed 
between russian experts and experts of the Council of europe. the papers of the 
Moscow seminar (January 1993) with the participation of representatives of the 
venice Commission (european Commission for democracy through Law)8 gives 
vivid evidence. the russian experts defended the position that the Fundamental Law 
only has the proper level of legal value to enshrine the basis of the new economic 
order and to foster economic transition.
6  See, e.g., Белокрылова О.С. Конституционная политическая экономия в контексте теории 
и практики // Вопросы регулирования экономики. 2014. № 5(1). С. 6–12 [Olga s. Belokrylova, 
The Constitutional Political Economy in the Context of Theory and Practice, 5(1) Journal of economic 
regulation 6 (2014)].
7  See, e.g., Гаджиев Г.А., Баренбойм П.Д., Лафитский В.И., Мау В.А., Захаров А.В., Мазаев В.Д., Кравчен- 
ко Д.В., Сырунина Т.М. Конституционная экономика [Gadis A. Gadzhiev et al., Constitutional Economics] 
(G.A. Gadzhiev (ed.), Moscow: yustitsinform, 2006); Гаджиев Г.А. Конституционные принципы 
рыночной экономики // Развитие основ гражданского права в решениях Конституционного 
Суда Российской Федерации [Gadis A. Gadzhiev, The Constitutional Principles of the Market Economy 
in Development of the Fundamentals of Civil Law in the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation] (Moscow: yurist, 2004); Конституционная экономика и антикризисная деятельность 
центральных банков: Сборник статей [Constitutional Economics and Anti-Crisis Activities of the Central 
Banks: Collection of Articles] (s.A. Golubev (ed.), Moscow: LuM, 2013); Болдырев О.Ю. Конституционное 
право и экономика: поиск методологии и бегство от идеологии // Конституционное 
и муниципальное право. 2015. № 4. С. 9–14 [Oleg yu. Boldyrev, Constitutional Law and Economics: 
Search of Methodology and Escape from Ideology, 4 Constitutional and Municipal Law 9 (2015)]; 
Самигуллин В.К. Экономический потенциал конституции // Конституционное и муниципальное 
право. 2015. № 4. С. 6–8 [venir k. samigullin, The Economic Potential of the Constitution, 4 Constitutional 
and Municipal Law 6 (2015)].
8  the european Commission for democracy through Law, better known as the venice Commission, is 
an advisory body of the Council of europe created in 1990 for the purpose of providing constitutional 
assistance in Central and eastern europe.
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the basic question to be asked is whether the economy should be 
regulated within the rigid framework of the Constitution, and if so to what 
extent, or if it would not be better left to ordinary law. the russian participants 
considered that the Constitution should contain at least the fundamental 
provisions protecting the weak against the possible abuses of a free market 
economy.
On the same line of thought, the Constitution should contain provisions 
guaranteeing the protection of social rights, even though the Courts would 
not be in a position to apply them directly. it should be remembered that this 
was part of the russian tradition, and that the people would not understand 
a different approach.9
the constitutional model of the russian economy is based on the concept 
of sustainable development, equal protection of all kinds of property, and the 
combination of advantages associated with the market and state regulation. On 
the whole, it is consistent with the welfare state model. the selection of this particular 
economic concept is determined by the social nature of the state, which is established 
by Art. 7(1) of the Constitution of the russian Federation. this implies that the state 
is obligated to build such a system for distributing social wealth that would ensure 
a dignified life and free personal development of every citizen as well as support 
for vulnerable social groups.
in the russian Constitution, in their organic unity, practically all norms and 
provisions have a bearing on the country’s socioeconomic system, establishing the 
basic principles and the logic of its development. At the same time, no separate 
chapter is expressly devoted to the economic agenda as such; instead, entire text 
of the Basic Law relates to it, including its preamble.
the Constitution establishes the basic principles of the economic system, 
enshrines the most important economic rights, defines the economic functions of the 
bodies of state power, and regulates the most significant issues of the functioning of 
individual institutions that are directly involved in the implementation of economic 
policy. 
the most important conceptual feature of the current russian Constitution is 
political and economic liberalism. At the same time, it contains the entire complex of 
ideas and principles developed by the democratic tradition of the last two centuries. 
the venice Commission mentioned as a positive fact that the russian Constitution 
has eliminated the difference between the “classical” human rights that include 
9  Transition to a New Model of Economy and Its Constitutional Reflections: Proceedings of the UniDem 
Seminar Organized in Moscow on 18 and 19 February 1993 in Co-operation with the Supreme Soviet of 
the Russian Federation, the Moscow State University, the Constitutional Court of Russia, the Constitutional 
Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Centre of the Supreme Soviet 28 
(strasbourg: Council of europe Press, 1993).
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civil and political rights, and the economic, social and cultural rights. According 
to international experts, enshrining a wide range of economic, social, and cultural 
rights in the Basic Law is a positive and progressive fact, as it reflects the traditions 
of russia’s previous constitutional development and
in a sense, is a working people’s social achievement not to be given up, 
particularly since the said rights were recognized in the international legal 
instruments concerned with the human rights.10
in practice, the new russian Constitution was the first to attempt to ensure 
the organic unity of the liberal principles of Natural Law with the social tradition of 
contemporary times.
this was reflected in an extremely condensed form in the economic provisions 
of Chapters 1 and 2 of the Constitution, which contain the fundamental principles 
of the state, social and political system and may not be changed other than by 
changing the entire Basic Law. 
1. Key Principles
the most important principles underpinning the constitutional model of the 
economic system of the russian Federation are economic sovereignty and economic 
security of the state; a single monetary system; multiple forms of ownership, including 
private, state (federal and that of constituent entities of the russian Federation), and 
municipal; the social function of ownership; the market economy; state regulation of 
economic activity; free enterprise and freedom of other types of economic activity; 
labor rights and liberties; free competition; economic and budgetary federalism; an 
effective tax and budget system; pursuing the goal of a reduction in social disparity; 
promoting the national economy; and providing conditions for the effective 
integration of the russian economy in the global economy. 
the entire logic of the russian Constitution is based on a combination of the 
principles of freedom and responsibility. the ideas of freedom are implemented 
through ensuring pluralism in the political (multipartyism and political freedom), 
economic (pluralism of the forms of ownership and freedom of enterprise), and 
ideological (inadmissibility of recognizing any ideology as prevailing) spheres. 
the Constitution of the russian Federation specifies the following basic economic 
rights and liberties:
– the freedom to perform economic activities (Art. 8(1));
– the right to the free movement of goods, services and financial resources 
(Arts. 8(1), 74);
10  Cited from Витрук Н.В. Верность Конституции [Nikolay v. vitruk, The Commitment to the Constitution] 
48–49 (Moscow: russian Academy of Justice, 2008).
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– the guarantees of equal recognition and protection of any forms of ownership, 
including private ownership (Art. 8(2));
– the freedom of movement and the freedom to choose a place in which to stay 
and reside (Art. 27);
– the freedom of labor (Art. 37(1 and 2);
– the freedom to choose an occupation, including choosing between 
entrepreneurship (self-employment) and employment (Arts. 34(1), 37(1));
– the freedom of enterprise (Art. 34(1);
– supporting the competition and protecting free competition (Arts. 8(1), 
34(2));
– the legislative guarantees of protection of private ownership rights 
(Art. 35(1)); 
– the freedom of creative activities (Art. 44(1));
– the guarantees of legislative protection of intellectual property (Art. 44(1)); 
etc.
the rights to the freedom of movement, freedom of enterprise, and freedom of contract 
are of particular importance. it is the implementation of these constitutional norms 
that makes political, economic and individual rights and liberties an indispensable 
part of public practices rather than a mere declaration.
2. The Free Market Economy
the free market economy provides the most important foundation for the 
constitutional system of the russian Federation. the creators of the russian 
Constitution aimed to provide “competitive advantages” for the implementation 
of the new model of the economic order. Constitutional provisions designed to 
promote market transition combine guarantees of personal and economic freedoms, 
social responsibility, and obeisance to the rule of law by the state. As noted by the 
researchers, a distinguishing feature of the 1993 Constitution is the supremacy of 
actual understanding of the principles of free market economy over their formal 
understanding.11 indeed, both the notion of “market economy” proper and a section 
expressly devoted to the country’s economic system are formally lacking in the 
Constitution of the russian Federation. this is an objective fact that reflects a certain 
political and ideological compromise. the fact is that the ideas of the free market and 
market economy do not rank among the values shared by the majority of the russian 
citizens. Moreover, even after many decades since the beginning of the reforms, the 
very terms “market” and “market economy” still remain semantically non-neutral.
As noted by Prof. sergey stepashin, for a considerable part of the population, 
market reforms are directly associated with personal social failure and profound 
11  See e.g., Степашин С.В. Конституционный аудит [sergey v. stepahshin, Constitutional Audit] 178–
194 (Moscow: Nauka, 2006); Gadzhiev et al. 2006.
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social upheaval while the term “market” became synonymous with the “shock 
reforms” and the subsequent serious social and economic problems.12 this does not 
mean that the market and market methods are bad as such. the problem is that the 
application of objectively neutral economic knowledge (methodologies, tools and 
standard technologies) in a concrete social context often leads to the formation of an 
emotional, and often disapproving, attitude towards both the knowledge itself and 
those who apply this knowledge. in case of the shock methods used to “restart” the 
russian economy in the early 1990s, the lingering echo of extremely negative social 
consequences led to bitter resentment of not only the model of market relationships 
but even of the words from the liberal vocabulary among a part of russian society.
Nevertheless, the development of the private sector and the rational use of 
market instruments for regulating economic relationships are objectively beneficial 
and necessary for the modernization of the russian economy.
As declared by the President of the russian Federation, vladimir Putin, in his 
Address to the Federal Assembly on 12 december 2012,
the economic freedom, private property, competition and a modern market 
economy [emphasis added], rather than state capitalism, must comprise the 
core of the new model of growth.13
Article 8 of the Constitution of the russian Federation contains a rather exhaustive 
description of the principles of the market economy reflected in its main characteristics: 
the guarantees of the rights of ownership; the freedom of enterprise; the support of 
competition; and the unity of economic space. Among the most important functions 
of the state that determine the limits of its possible intervention in economics, the 
Constitution first and foremost emphasizes fundamental liberal values such as 
protection of property and support of competition.
Other elements of the market economy that are directly enshrined in the 
Constitution of the russian Federation are property, enterprise and labor. At the 
same time, the economic function of the state is essentially transformed: instead of 
managing the national economy in the context of the nationalization of property, 
the state becomes a regulator of economic relationships, retaining its function 
of managing public property only (federal property or property belonging to 
constituent entities of the russian Federation).14
12  stepahshin 2006, at 184.
13  Послание Президента Российской Федерации Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации, 
12 декабря 2012 г. [Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the russian Federation, 
12 december 2012] (May 3, 2018), available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4739.
14  See Эбзеев Б.С. Человек, народ, государство в конституционном строе Российской Федерации 
[Boris s. ebzeev, Man, people, state in the constitutional system of the Russian Federation] 405 (Moscow: 
yurizdat, 2005).
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3. The State’s Regulatory Role
Although there is no direct statement of the importance of the state’s regulatory 
role in the russian Constitution which is based on the ideas of civil society detached 
from the state, this role is, nevertheless, obvious and reflected in many provisions of 
the Basic Law. For instance, it is the state that regulates the institution of property, 
labor and principles of distribution; establishes the minimum wage and the taxes; 
forms and spends the state budget; and pursues the state investment policy.
it should also be mentioned that there is no public consensus concerning not only 
“market values” but also over the values of the “welfare economy,” state paternalism, 
and the limits of state intervention in economic life in contemporary russia.
For instance, self-supporting constituent entities often regard the extended social 
commitments of the state and the policy of state paternalism as a cause of social 
dependency and civil passivity. it is obvious, however, that a socially-responsible 
economy is a normatively endorsed benefit for a significant part of the populace 
and, therefore, enshrining this principle in the Basic Law became one of the key 
underlying elements of the new social consensus. 
the social nature of the state, declared in Art. 7(1) of the rF Constitution, implies 
that the state is obliged to create a development model that would guarantee the 
principles of social equality, solidarity and mutual responsibility. 
the Constitution of the russian Federation reflects the idea of the social function 
of property. this follows from the abovementioned principle of the welfare state as 
well as from a systemic interpretation of provisions of Art. 9, which establishes that 
the land and other natural resources may be in private, state, municipal and other 
forms of ownership (Art. 9(2)) but, at the same time, stipulates that they should be 
used and protected in the russian Federation as the basis for the life and activity 
of the peoples living in the territories concerned (Art. 9(1)). the social function 
of property also follows from Art. 35(3), which allows for the forcible alienation 
of property for state needs, Art. 36(2), according to which the private owners of 
land may freely exercise their powers as long as it does not cause damage to the 
environment or infringe upon the rights and lawful interests of other persons; while 
Art. 34(2) of the Constitution of the russian Federation forbids any economic activity 
aimed at monopolization and unfair competition.15
As noted above, there is also no public consensus on the permissible “depth 
of immersion”16 of the state in economic regulation. According to the ideas of 
constitutionalism, the Basic Law should establish the limits of state interference 
in economic life, and, first and foremost, in the private sector of the economy. 
however, due to the historical features of the Constitution of 1993, these limits 
15 ebzeev 2005, at 407.
16  A quote from Gadis Gadzhiev, a russian Constitutional Court judge.
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were not defined strictly and unambiguously. As is well known, the Constitution 
of russia arose in a time of opposition between political elites and competition 
between ideas about the model of the new social and economic order, about the 
purposes of social development and the ways to achieve the same. in the context of 
the escalation of the political struggle and civil confrontation, the Constitution was 
designed primarily to provide a basis for the restoration of social unity and harmony. 
that is why the Constitution enshrined the most general principles and declarations, 
accepted by all political opponents, to create the core for consensus but did not 
specify the details to avoid a new burst of conflicts. the frame and procedural nature 
of the Constitution also stems from the fact that this document was developed in 
the situation of transition and, therefore, it objectively could not contain a detailed 
description of the institutions that were still in the process of formation.
Being an instrument of “compulsion to consensus,” the Constitution of 1993 
provides the rules and tools for the establishment of a new system of state 
power based on the principles of division of powers and their mutual deterrence. 
Furthermore, the Basic Law provides a set of efficient mechanisms and algorithms to 
maintain the proper balance of powers, to maintain social harmony, and to prevent 
and resolve possible conflicts at various levels. it is noteworthy that the mentioned 
mechanisms and algorithms have no political overtones. it does not matter who 
the current president, chairman of the federal government, or head of the region is. 
the persons may change, but the procedures resulting in consent remain standard 
and work effectively. 
however, even if the authorities and political elites agree to follow the established 
constitutional procedures, this does not give a 100% guarantee of the successful 
implementation of constitutional principles. A political and legal culture, respect 
for the rule of law, and unity in understanding the ideas of the Basic Law are even 
more critical factors for success.
when the first state duma appeared in russia, Pyotr stolypin17 wrote about 
the crucial importance for the branches of power to find a common language. 
he believed that such a “common language” should be found in the unified 
understanding of national and state objectives.18 in fact, a constitution adopted by 
all branches of government and by political forces is created precisely to ensure “a 
unified understanding of national and state objectives.” this understanding was 
particularly important in an era of large-scale societal transformation, when the 
country is choosing a new trajectory for development.
17  Pyotr stolypin (1862–1911) was a russian statesman, reformer and Prime Minister from 1906 to 1911.
18  Столыпин П.А. Нам нужна Великая Россия. Полное собрание речей в Государственной думе 
и Государственном совете. 1906–1911 [Pyotr A. stolypin, We Need a Great Russia. A Full Collection 
of Speeches in the State Duma and the State Council. 1906–1911] 62–65 (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 
1991).
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unfortunately, even today, such a unified understanding of constitutional 
principles has not yet developed. Although, for constitutional experts, the principles 
and logic setting the limits for state intervention are apparent. According to the 
russian Constitutional Court judge Gadis Gadzhiev,
almost all constitutional norms that establish economic freedom, the 
rights of citizens in the economic sphere, the limits of their restrictions 
genetically related to civil law… the state, by establishing, in the Constitution, 
the rules on its functions in the economy, undertakes a new constitutional 
obligation.
if the state guarantees to protect fundamental economic rights, it is obliged 
to be reasonable in its application of restrictive legal tools.19 this also means that 
constitutional provisions set the limits for state intervention and presence in the 
area of private entrepreneurship, as well as the personal lives of citizens.
since society and political elites did not fully perceive the ideas of constitutionalism, 
a lack of unity in the understanding of the constitutional principles leads to a lack of 
agreement in the interpretation of norms establishing the limits of state intervention 
in the economy. As a result, practice shows that the scope of state regulation is 
continually expanding, while the volume of economic freedoms is decreasing. 
Nevertheless, the expert position that constitutional provisions are “guilty” in 
the situation when “courts and practice have the opportunity to evaluate such rules 
in their interests”20 (in other words, interpret them in favor of the state) is, at least, 
naive, because it mixes causes and consequences. the conclusion saying that the 
“ambivalence” of the norms of the Constitution became the basis for “neutrality” 
declared by the russian Constitutional Court in the assessment the economic 
policy pursued by the state21 demonstrates a similar substitution of cause and 
consequence.
As practice shows, this kind of “neutrality” is a political and legal choice that 
ultimately affects the economy. the current “depth of immersion” of the state in 
the economy is beginning to interfere with economic development. As President 
vladimir Putin noted in his Address to the Federal Assembly on 1 March 2018,
19  Гаджиев Г.А. Экономическая Конституция. Конституционные гарантии свободы предприни-
мательской (экономической) деятельности // Конституционный вестник. 2008. № 1(19). С. 249–
263 [Gadis A. Gadzhiev, Economic Constitution. Constitutional Guarantees of Freedom of Entrepreneurial 
(Economic) Activity, 1(19) Constitutional Bulletin 249 (2008)].
20  Нефедов Д.В. Экономическая теория как основание конституционного толкования // Право-
ведение. 2013. № 5(310). C. 220 [dmitriy v. Nefyodov, Economic Theory as a Foundation of the 
Constitutional Interpretation, 5(310) Jurisprudence 215, 220 (2013)].
21  Gadzhiev 2008, at 251.
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in order for the economy to work in full force, we need to radically improve 
the business climate, and ensure the highest level of entrepreneurial freedoms 
and competition. i want to outline a principled position here. the state’s share 
in the economy should gradually decline.22
in fairness, we have to note that the decision of the courts to side with the state and 
large corporations is a widespread phenomenon. in fact, the russian courts are going, 
with some delay, through the same evolutionary path as the economic justice of the 
united states. American legal history knows a period called the “Lochner era” (1897–
1937). it was a time when the u.s. supreme Court found it necessary and useful to strike 
down economic regulations adopted by a state if these laws were held to be infringing 
on economic liberty or private contract rights. But, since the end of the Lochner era, 
the concept that “the Constitution generally should leave economic policy decisions 
to the legislative and executive branches”23 has prevailed in the usA.
According to the American Professor Martha t. McCluskey, this approach has led 
to the fact that the American dream gradually disappears because the principles 
of freedom and equal economic opportunity are no longer protected by the 
Constitution and the courts:
Not only has the u.s. supreme Court turned away from the constitutional 
protection of those with modest resources, but it also has increasingly (though 
often subtly) used the Constitution to limit political branches’ discretion to 
promote equality.24
the author considers it is time for an ambitious constitutional vision of economic 
justice and the creation of mechanisms to ensure constitutional protections against 
economic inequality.
4. Economic Federalism
yet another key principle of the organization and functioning of the state, social 
and economic system in russia is federalism, which is reflected in many provisions 
of the Constitution of the russian Federation. One of the fundamental principles of 
federalism is the unity of economic space (Art. 8(1)), supported by the provisions 
of Art. 74(1) stating that
22  Послание Президента Российской Федерации Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации, 
1 марта 2018 г. [Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of russian Federation, 1 March 2018] 
(May 3, 2018), available at http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957#sel=155:1:1kp, 
155:4:vpk.
23  Martha t. Mccluskey, Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power for “We the People,” 35 yale Law & 
Policy review 271 (2016).
24  Id.
SERGEY SHAKHRAY, ANdREY YANIK 85
No customs borders, duties, levies, or any other barriers to the free 
movement of goods, services, or financial means shall be permitted in the 
territory of the russian Federation.
Among other federalist provisions we can mention the equality of rights of 
the constituent entities of the russian Federation (Art. 5(1 and 4)), the principle of 
a single monetary system (Art. 75(1)), the unity of the system of executive bodies 
in the russian Federation at the federal and regional levels within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the russian Federation and the rF’s powers concerned with the 
matters within the joint competence of the russian Federation and its constituent 
entities, which allows a uniform and cohesive policy to be pursued across the entire 
country (Art. 77(2)).
An important principle of federalism consists in the participation of constituent 
entities of the russian Federation in decision-making concerned with the federal 
budget; federal taxes and levies; financial, currency, monetary and customs 
regulation; and the issue of money. to implement this principle, the Constitution 
enshrined mandatory consideration by the Chamber of regions (the Federation 
Council) of the relevant federal legislation adopted by the state duma of the Federal 
Assembly of the russian Federation (Art. 106(a, b, c)).
the constitutional model of economic federalism enables the effective 
implementation of the principle of “unity in multitude.” On the one hand, the exclusive 
competences of the russian Federation include establishing a legal framework for 
the single market; financial, currency, monetary and customs regulation; the issue of 
money; pricing policy guidelines; federal economic agencies including federal banks 
(Art. 71(g)); as well as determining the basic principles of federal policy and federal 
programs concerned with the country’s economic development (Art. 71(f )). On the 
other hand, the constituent entities of the russian Federation enjoy full state power 
and freedom of choice (including in the field of economic decision-making) outside 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the russian Federation and the rF’s powers concerned 
with the matters within the joint competence of the russian Federation and its 
constituent entities (Art. 73). the Constitution thus provides a framework for creating 
a mechanism for fine-tuning the strategy and tactics of the federal socioeconomic 
policy to the specific needs of concrete constituent entities of the russian Federation, 
so as to ensure the equal standards of wellbeing and development possibilities 
across the entire country.
5. The State’s Tax and Budget System
the Constitution of the russian Federation also enshrines the fundamental 
principles for the state’s tax system. in particular, it is established that the federal taxes 
and levies are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the russian Federation (Art. 71(h)) 
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while the general principles of taxation and levying in the russian Federation are 
within the joint jurisdiction of the russian Federation and its constituent entities 
(Art. 72(i)). According to the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation,
taxes are the most important source of budget revenue at the expense 
of which compliance with, and protection of, citizens’ rights and liberties, as 
well as the exercising of the state’s social function, shall be ensured (Arts. 2 
and 7 of the Constitution of the russian Federation). without the proceeds 
of tax payments to the budget, the financing of enterprises fulfilling the 
government contracts, as well as public health institutions, education, army, 
law enforcement agencies, etc., would be impossible, as would the payment 
of wages to public-sector employees.25
the Constitution obliges everyone to pay the legally established taxes and levies, 
at the same time, establishing a rule under which the laws introducing new taxes or 
deteriorating the taxpayers’ position shall have no retroactive effect (Art. 57).
draft laws introducing or abolishing taxes and exemptions from the payment 
thereof may only be introduced following a resolution of the Government of the 
russian Federation (Art. 104(3)) while, as already mentioned, the tax laws adopted 
by the state duma are subject to obligatory consideration by the Federation Council 
of the Federal Assembly of the russian Federation (Art. 106(b)). 
the constitutional codification of the principles of budgetary relationships, and the 
definition of the place, role, and functions of the state budget comprises an essential 
element of the fundamentals of the economic system. All modern constitutions contain 
requirements to include all the state’s revenue and expenditure in the budget. this is 
a general principle, the observance of which is strictly controlled in every country.
the Constitution of the russian Federation only establishes general principles for 
the budget and budgetary relationships, giving enough latitude in the complicated 
process of formation of the country’s budget system that is best suited for addressing 
the socioeconomic development objectives and contemporary challenges. 
under the Basic Law, the federal budget is the exclusive competence of the 
russian Federation (Art. 1(h)). the federal budget is developed and submitted for 
the state duma’s approval by the Government of the russian Federation, which then 
25  See Постановление Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации от 23 декабря 1997 г. № 21-П 
“По делу о проверке конституционности пункта 2 статьи 855 Гражданского кодекса Российской 
Федерации и части шестой статьи 15 Закона Российской Федерации ‘Об основах налоговой 
системы в Российской Федерации’ в связи с запросом Президиума Верховного Суда Российской 
Федерации,” Собрание законодательства РФ, 1997, № 52, ст. 5930 [ruling of the Constitutional Court 
of the russian Federation No. 21-P of 23 december 1997. the Case of testing the Constitutionality 
of Paragraph 2 of Article 855 of the Civil Code of the russian Federation and Part six of Article 15 of 
the Law of the russian Federation “On the Fundamental Principles of the tax system in the russian 
Federation” in Connection with the request of the Presidium of the supreme Court of the russian 
Federation, Legislation Bulletin of the russian Federation, 1997, No. 52, Art. 5930].
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works to ensure the execution of the budget approved by federal law, and submits 
the annual report to the parliament (Art. 114(a)). 
Any draft laws making provisions for the expenditures covered by the federal 
budget may only be introduced to the state duma following a resolution of the 
Government of the russian Federation (Art. 104(3)). 
the federal laws adopted by the state duma and concerned with the federal 
budget issues are subject to obligatory consideration by the Council of the Federation 
(Art. 106(a)). 
to control the execution of the federal budget, the Federation Council and 
the state duma form the Accounts Chamber whose composition and operating 
procedures are controlled by federal law (Art. 101(5)). the Accounts Chamber, acting 
on behalf of the taxpayers and in the best interests of society, appears in parliament 
to present its evaluation of the draft budget and report the results of the audit of 
budget execution.
the Budget Code of the russian Federation regulates budgetary relationships 
in more detail.26 in particular, the Budget Code defines the budget in general terms 
as a form of generation and disbursement of monetary assets intended for financial 
backing for the objectives and functions of the state and local self-government 
(Art. 6).
As a legal category, the budget is:
– the national fund of public monetary assets created to meet the government 
expenditure;
– the state’s financial plan specifying its revenue and expenditure;
– the principal (main) financial plan in the country since, apart from the state 
budget, other financial plans also exist such as the plans of enterprises, agencies, 
and organizations (balance sheets, budget estimates);
– the object of budgetary legal relationships, reflected in the legal budgetary 
provisions.
As a financial category and a link in the country’s financial system, the state budget 
is a special form of redistribution relationships, associated with a part of a national 
income being transferred into the ownership of the state (or a constituent entity of 
the russian Federation) and utilized to meet the needs of the entire society and its 
individual territorial entities. the budget redistributes national income and a part of 
national wealth between the territorial entities and national economy sectors. More 
than other links of the financial system, the redistribution of national income using 
budgetary methods is determined by the needs of extended reproduction in general 
and the objectives facing the society at each stage of its historical development.
26  Бюджетный кодекс Российской Федерации от 31 июля 1998 г. № 145-ФЗ, Собрание законо-
дательства РФ, 1998, № 31, ст. 3823; 2018, № 1 (ч. 1), ст. 18 [Budget Code of the russian Federation 
No. 145-FZ of 31 July 1998, Legislation Bulletin of the russian Federation, 1998, No. 31, Art. 3823; 
2018, No. 1 (Part 1), Art. 18].
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the budget is a public law category, normatively consolidated and exclusively 
used to express the national interest, and, therefore, relationships in this sphere are 
mainly regulated by the binding norms.
the Budget Code of the russian Federation also provides a legislative definition 
of the notion of the “budget system of the Russian Federation.” such system understood 
as a combination of federal budget, the budgets of constituent entities of the russian 
Federation, municipal budgets, and the budgets of the state extra-budgetary funds, 
which is based on the economic relationships and state structure of the russian 
Federation and regulated by the rF legislation. 
the following main constitutional and legal principles underpin the budget 
system of the russian Federation:
– the unity of the country’s budget system; 
– the autonomy of budgets, i.e. budgets of different levels having their own sources 
of revenue and enjoying a right to determine how to disburse this revenue; 
– transparency and accountability of the government bodies’ activities as regards 
budget formation and execution;
– delimitation of revenue and expenditure between the levels of the budget 
system of the russian Federation; 
– budget balance (ensuring the matching of expenditure against revenue, as 
well as the development and implementation of measures aimed to increase budget 
revenue and cut budget expenditure); 
– effectiveness and economy of the use of budget funds; 
– coverage of total (aggregate) expenditure;
– budget validity (the budget ought to be based on reliable indicators of the 
forecast of socioeconomic development of a territory and the realistic estimates of 
budget revenue and expenditure); and
– budget funds targeting.
6. Mechanisms for Guaranteeing the Stability  
of the Monetary System
One of the important aspects of the constitutional model of russia’s economy is 
the principle of independence of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, enshrined 
in the Basic Law. According to Art. 75(2) of the rF Constitution, the main function 
of the Central Bank of the russian Federation, performed independently of other 
bodies of state power, is protecting and ensuring stability of the ruble. According 
to Art. 75(1), only the Central Bank is entitled to issue money in russia. 
the idea of central banks being independent from the executive and legislative 
bodies of state power first emerged in the late 19th century but began to be implemented 
in constitutional and legal reality in the second half of the 20th century. 
rather than with the theoretical matters, the constitutional codification of the 
principle of independence of the Bank of russia was largely associated with the 
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practical need to create additional mechanisms to guarantee the stability of the 
monetary system of the young state that was compelled to carry out reforms in 
a situation of financial and economic crisis that had erupted in the last few years of 
the ussr’s existence. 
As is well known, the profound budgetary and financial crisis inherited from 
the soviet union produced a very negative impact on the development of the new 
model of russia’s economy. At the same time, the crisis was so protracted largely 
because of the lack of consistency in the policies of the different branches of the new 
russia’s power in the early 1990s. Any positive effect of the Government’s measures 
aimed at reducing inflation and promoting macroeconomic stabilization often came 
to naught because of the inflationist policy of the deputy corps. this process was 
particularly vividly manifested in 1992–1993 when the supreme soviet of the russian 
Federation could directly intervene in the Central Bank’s financial policy.
therefore, enshrining the independent status of the Bank of russia in the 
constitution reduces the risks of political expediency affecting the stability of the 
country’s monetary and credit system as well as the banking sphere, and helps curb 
inflation.
Conclusion: “Conflicting” Constitutional Values  
as a Source of Development
to sum up, the Constitution of 1993 has some inherent traits, which seem 
contradictory, at first glance. On the one hand, it is a rigorous codification of 
fundamental principles, including a complicated procedure for making amendments 
to the text of the Constitution. On the other hand, it is the absence of prohibitions on 
the broadest political and legal creativity within the existing constitutional limits. 
some economists consider it a serious problem that the current russian 
Constitution equally defends the principles of economic freedom and, at the same 
time, the social nature of the state. For instance, there exists an opinion that the first 
two chapters of the Constitution
contain more liberal provisions than other sections. the implementation 
of the liberal principle declared in the Fundamentals of the Constitutional 
system and individual rights and Freedoms becomes difficult when it comes 
to the concrete problems in the functioning of the economic and political 
system. this is caused by the conflict between liberalism declared by the 
Constitution and the actual possibilities for its implementation in the post-
socialist society. this gap is clearly discernible if we consider the authorities 
of the bodies of state power (including those associated with the adoption 
of regulatory legal acts) to interfere with the freedom of economic activity, 
being governed by various “public” interests. such interests, first and foremost, 
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include the state’s constitutional obligation to guarantee social protection 
to the populace.27
the problem of social justice is another difficult problem. it is well known that the 
interpretation of the principle of justice depends on the worldview and concrete 
stage in the development of a society. this principle may be understood both as 
ensuring maximum material equality of all members of society; as preventing an 
excessive gap between the rich and the poor; creating equal start conditions for 
each individual; as the state’s obligation to provide support to the most vulnerable 
groups; and as provision of a minimum set of basic social guarantees to all citizens. 
the right choice of “criteria of justice” and the effective practical implementation of 
a suitable policy provides an important basis for the stability of democratic systems 
because a profound social inequality undermines the political and economic stability 
of society, while an excessive concentration of public resources in the hands of 
a minority destroys the principles of democracy and creates a barrier to steady social 
and economic development.
in fact, however, there is no irresolvable conflict between the principles of 
economic freedom and the social nature of the state. these values are equal; they 
create a “corridor of opportunity” within which the state’s socioeconomic policy 
is balancing. On the one hand, it is extremely important to find the right balance 
between the provision of the conditions of freedom for the development of private 
initiative, and social responsibility; between the interests of free individual and the 
interests of society. On the other hand, it is no less important to maintain the right 
balance between achieving social justice for individual groups, and the need to 
ensure the incentives for the development of the economy in the best interests of 
the whole society. 
Continuous expansion of the social functions of the state increases the risk of 
the country falling into the trap of paternalism, thus reducing the chances for the 
country’s successful transition to the model of innovational development. A strongly 
paternalistic society does not, objectively, need any changes and innovations: a stable 
and guaranteed access to a slice of public cake (even if it is not too big) is much more 
important than a possibility to act independently and risk for a possible (although not 
guaranteed in advance) increase of the level of one’s own and one’s family’s wellbeing. 
Paradoxical as it may seem, maintaining the situation when a great number of citizens 
receive various benefits from the public sector is advantageous for bureaucracy whose 
“bureaucratic rent” continuously increases due to public sector growth. 
Practically no doubt remains today that the welfare state model in its pure form is 
not sufficiently effective. the facts indicate that, when the state’s social commitments 
fall outside the bounds of what reasonable and fair, this leads to the exhaustion of 
27  Gadzhiev et al. 2006, at 31–32.
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the sources of growth, slowdown, and deterioration of human capital due to growing 
welfare mentality.
therefore, the concept of a workfare state is gaining ground.28 According to this 
approach, solely partnership and mutual responsibility of the state and its citizens 
can be a source of the growth of social welfare: a modern social state must only 
provide for the basic needs of the individuals (minimum subsistence level, education, 
health care, infrastructure, etc.) while the citizens must invest their own labor in the 
development of society to receive their proportional shares of public benefits.29 the 
concept of a workfare state rejects the welfare mentality and the citizens’ propensity 
for free rider behavior,30 and expects higher civil conscientiousness and social activity 
from each citizen.
Only an effective state working in partnership with free and responsible citizens 
is able to address the problem of combining market methods with a socially 
responsible economy.
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